Case studies - faults in "shared care" in the reformed scheme
Case Studies - anomalies in the reformed shared-care formula
1 Two separated parents earn the same and share care 4:3. The NRP becomes far worse off than the PWC, and would be much better off never seeing the child.
2 Two rich parents share care equally. The person claiming Child Benefit is encouraged to use the CSA to obtain an unfair stream of money from the NRP.
3 The NRP is on benefits and the PWC earns. The NRP is financially abandoned by the state and the other parent while caring for the child.
4 Both parents earn the same low pay and share care equally. The parent claiming Child Benefit can also claim WFTC and childcare tax credits. The state bribes the NRP never to see the children.
5 Like "1", but they earn a little more and share care 5:2, with similar results.
6 Both parents are on benefits and share care. Only the PWC gets help from the state for the child.
7 This shows the totally unexplained difference between the way the CSA White Paper deals with equal split care and with equal shared care of two children.
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Case Study 4

The situation

Both parents work for at least 30 hours for £100 net income per week. The mother receives Child Benefit.

They shared care exactly equally, with their daughter spending one week with one parent, one week with the other. During weekdays, whoever has the daughter has to spend £10 per day on childcare.

The result

The parent who claims Child Benefit ends up with much more money than she earns, because of all the money that the government supports her with - Child Benefit, Working Families Tax Credit, and childcare tax credit.

The parent who doesn't claim Child Benefit, in spite of earning exactly the same, and caring for their daughter exactly the same, ends up with about half the money he earns.

Alternative situation

Suppose instead that they had previously decided that they needed more money to be provided by the government. So they had agreed that the mother should look after the child full time.

The result

The mother retains £25.05 less per week as a result of caring for the children full time (while still working and using childcare each working day).

The father now retains £95 per week. So by giving up care of the children, he has become £43 better off. (He may use some of it to privately subsidise the mother).

Taxpayers pay £36.95 extra per week to enable the father to be £43 better off by never seeing his child. Taxpayers are subsidising him by a large amount to abandon his children, at the expense of the mother.

This is an HTML transcription of an article written in September 1999, hence the benefits rates, the references to the White Paper, etc.

Page last updated: 5 July, 2004 © Copyright Barry Pearson 2003