Case studies - faults in "shared care" in the reformed scheme
Tony is required to pay Cherie £129 per week. If he never saw the children he would pay £258. But he cares for the children 50% of the time, while she earns twice his income and receives all the child benefit. She doesn't have to pay him 12.5% of her income when he cares for the children, so why does he pay her nearly 12.5% of his?
Tony spends an average of £389 out of his earned income per week, comprising this Child Support of £258 one week then the direct spend on their children of £520 the next week on top of this.
Cherie also directly spends £520 each alternate week. However, this is offset by the £258 from Tony for that week and the £33.60 of Child Benefit every week (whoever is caring for the children that week). So she spends an average of less than £98 per week out of her own earnings.
The reasons are:
By far the best solution for high-earners such as these is to remove the anomalies (such as the White Paper's unfair "equal sharing rule") which would encourage someone like Cherie to use the CSA rather than come to a private agreement. Then leave them to sort out their own affairs unless enforcement is needed. The CSA has a hard enough task without being used by people playing games.
This case study is based on:
This is an HTML transcription of an article written in September 1999, hence the benefits rates, the references to the White Paper, etc.
|Page last updated: 5 July, 2004||© Copyright Barry Pearson 2003|